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Abstract
The aim of this study is to contribute to the growing literature on the quality of accounting disclosures
by family firms by investigating whether the alignment (entrenchment) effect leads to high (low)
corporate transparency. Unlike previous studies, this study also examines the relationship between board
composition and corporate transparency by distinguishing between the two types of nonexecutive
directors, namely independent and affiliated directors. Using the enhanced segment disclosures by
Malaysian firms in 2001/2002 as a proxy of corporate transparency, the results indicate that family firms
are more inclined to disclose all the required items for the primary basis of segment reporting, consistent
with Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan (2007) and Wang (2006). The result also indicates that firms with
higher proportion of affiliated directors aremore likely tomake greater segment disclosures. However, no
evidence is found to support the contention that independent directors and institutional investors promote
corporate transparency, consistent with previous Malaysian studies.
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1. Introduction
An important area of accounting research receiving much attention recently, emphasizes
the influence that corporate governance may exert on corporate transparency (Ahmed &
Duellman, 2007; Ajinkya, Bhojraj, & Sengupta, 2005; Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007;
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Beekes & Brown, 2006; Beekes, Pope, & Young, 2004; Fan & Wong, 2002; Garcia-Lara,
Garcia-Osma, & Penalva, 2007; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Wang, 2006). The dimensions
of corporate transparency these studies investigate include quality of earnings in terms of
accruals quality, earnings informativeness, and accuracy and bias of management earnings
forecast.1 Two internal corporate governance characteristics that are extensively investigated
are ownership structures and board attributes. Given that the two extreme types of ownership
structure, namely diffused ownership (widely held shareholder system) and concentrated
ownership (controlling shareholder system), give rise to two types of agency problems —
Type I (manager opportunism or the misalignment effect) and Type II (owner opportunism or
the entrenchment effect) (see, for example, Gilson, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006)— recent
studies have begun to focus more on the linkage between family firms and the quality of
accounting disclosures (see, for example, Ali et al., 2007; Chen, Chen, & Cheng, 2008; Patelli
& Prencipe, 2007; Wang, 2006).
The effect of ownership structure on corporate transparency remains an unsettled area of
research interest. For example, Fan andWong (2002) argue that the entrenchment effect and the
proprietary-information effect associated with concentrated ownership result in corporate
opacity and low informativeness of accounting earnings.Wang (2006), on the other hand, argues
that a founding family firm with its unique concentrated ownership is “less likely to engage in
opportunistic behavior in reporting accounting earnings because it potentially could damage the
family's reputation,wealth and long-term firmperformance” (p. 622).When the alignment effect
overwhelms the entrenchment effect, the family firm would be inclined to report high quality
financial information. Ali et al. (2007) show that the difference in Type I agency problems across
family firms and nonfamily firms dominates the difference due to Type II agency problem. Thus,
they observe that family firm reports higher earnings quality than nonfamily firm. This study
contributes to the current debate on the alignment versus entrenchment effect of family firms by
investigating whether family firms are associated with greater corporate transparency.
The proxy used as an indicator of corporate transparency is the early adoption of an
accounting standard associated with greater disclosure, namely the disaggregation of accounting
information by business segments. Companies that adopt Financial Reporting Standard (FRS)
114, previously known as Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) 22, prior to its
effective date, are deemed to be proponents of corporate transparency. The standard on segment
disclosure is chosen primarily because, during the study period, there is evidence to suggest
users' dissatisfaction with the quality of segment disclosures as illustrated in the AIMR
Corporate Disclosure Survey 2000 and OECD White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia
2003.
In Malaysia, from 1987–2001, companies listed on Bursa Malaysia were required to
comply with the original International Accounting Standard (IAS) 14. The revised IAS 14,
which became effective for periods beginning on or after 1 July 1998, has not been
immediately adopted in Malaysia. With the introduction of MASB 22, in 2001, listed
companies inMalaysia are required to disclose segment data similar to the requirements under
the revised IAS 14 for the periods beginning on or after 1 January 2002. The FRS 114-cum-
1 Earnings informativeness is often measured by the earnings response coefficient (or earnings explanatory
power for returns) and earnings conservatism (or asymmetric timeliness of earnings, .i.e., speedier recognition of
bad news than good news in earnings).
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IAS 14 (revised) presents major departures from the original IAS 14. The differences include
the adoption of a two-tier segmentation with either the business segment or the geographical
segment as the dominant basis of segment reporting (primary), consistent use of accounting
policies across segments, and a standardized measure of segment results across companies.
Since FRS 114 requires additional disclosures, such as depreciation and amortization
expenses and other significant noncash expenses by reportable segments, it follows that
companies that adopt FRS 114 prior to its effective date were voluntarily disclosing more
information especially for the primary basis of segment reporting. In addition, unlike the
original IAS 14, FRS 114 requires disclosures of segment liabilities in the primary segment
reports and capital expenditure, if any, in both the primary and secondary segment reports.
Another tension in the corporate governance literature is the efficacy of the two different
types of nonexecutive directors. Various codes on “best practice” in corporate governance
around the world advocate, that the composition of the board of directors should have a mix
of executive and nonexecutive directors (see, for example, Cadbury Report, 1992; King
Committee Report, 1994; Bosch Committee Report, 1995). The argument is that
nonexecutive directors, who are presumably independent of management, provide a
check and balance; they are expected to monitor and control the actions of self-serving
executive directors on behalf of the external shareholders.
On the other hand a special report on nonexecutive directors in The Economist (20 March
2004, pp. 71–73) cautions that independent directors may not behave so independently, and
thus compromising their objectivity and loyalty to the shareholders. In addition, the report
warns that ignorance may be the dangerous price of independence. The report, citing Carter
and Lorsch (2004), further highlights a special breed of nonexecutive director who is not
independent. This nonindependent nonexecutive director is often known as an affiliated or
“grey” director. Klein (1998), Hermalin and Weisbech (2003), Matolcsy, Stokes and Wright
(2005), Peng (2004) and Fich (2005), among others, highlight the distinction between an
affiliated director and an independent director, who are both nonmanagement members of the
board. According toKlein (1998), apart from being a part timer, an affiliated director is usually
an ex-employee, or related to the firm's controlling family, or an interlocking director, or a
professional with significant business or financial ties with the firm. Similarly, Peng (2004)
defines affiliated and independent directors as “nonmanagement directors who have family
and/or professional relationships with the firm or firm management and nonmanagement
directors with no such relationship respectively” (p. 454). Since affiliated directors have prior
associations with the firm, they often have intimate knowledge of the firm and its industry
compared to many independent directors, and, thus, shareholders may feel affiliated directors
rather than independent directors are better serving them.
Although a few studies on board composition and firm performance acknowledge the
dichotomy between independent and affiliated directors (see, for example, Anderson & Reeb,
2004; Daily & Dalton, 1994; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Hermalin &
Weisbech, 2003; Peng, 2004), there is a notable lack of empirical evidence on the relative
efficacy of the two distinct types of nonexecutive directors in promoting corporate
transparency. Past studies predominantly examine the monitoring role of independent
directors or nonexecutive directors by treating independent and affiliated directors as a
homogenous group. As a first attempt to assess the relative influence of independent versus
affiliated directors in fortifying corporate transparency, and in response to the call for
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researchers to focus on how ownership structures shape accounting policies in emerging
markets and transition economies (Fan & Wong, 2002, p. 404), this study considers whether
ownership structure (family firm versus nonfamily firm) and board composition (independent
director proportion and affiliated director proportion) influence the timing of adoption of an
accounting standard.
Malaysia provides an ideal setting to investigate the influence of family firm ownership and
board composition on corporate transparency. First, family firms are prevalent in Malaysia.
An article in the SouthChinaMorning Post (dated 28August 2002, as cited by Jaggi, Leung&
Gul, 2009) states that Hong Kong has the third highest percentage of family ownership of
listed companies in the region after Indonesia andMalaysia. This is further supported by Liew
(2007), who concludes, based on evidence presented by Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1999)
andWorld Bank (2001), that “companies inMalaysia are typically controlled by a small group
of related parties and managed by owner–managers” (p. 726). Second, data on board mix is
readily available, since the annual reports of listed companies in Malaysia must include the
profile of each of the directors and specify whether the director is an executive,
nonindependent nonexecutive, or independent nonexecutive.2
The results indicate that family firms (proxied by the proportion of family members on the
board) and boards with a greater proportion of affiliated directors are more inclined towards
early adoption of FRS 114 in full (disclose all primary segments items) than delayed adoption.
The significance of this research is as follows: First, the finding that family firms are more
likely to make greater segmental disclosures is consistent with Wang (2006) and Ali et al.
(2007)who show that Type II agency problems are overshadowed byType I agency problems.
Second, our results show differential effects on the contribution of independent versus
affiliated directors in enhancing corporate transparency. Thus, treating both independent and
affiliated directors as a homogenous group may mask their equivocal influences on board
monitoring and performance.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews prior studies and develops
the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the identification of early adopters, the procedure to
match early adopters against nonearly adopters, empirical tests, data collection, and sample
characteristics. The findings are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 describes the main
conclusions, practical implications, limitations of the study, and suggestions of avenues for
future research.
2. Prior studies and hypothesis development
As mentioned above, there are two types of agency costs. Type I arises from the
separation of corporate ownership from corporate management, whereby shareholders who
invest in the business do not intend to play an active role in its management (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). They designate firm managers to run the company with the goal of
maximizing shareholder wealth. This can lead to conflict-of-interest situations, whereby
2 Paragraph 9.25 of the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements states that the particulars of each director shown
in the annual report must include the name, age, nationality, qualification, and whether the position is an
executive or non-executive one and whether such director is an independent director. Among other particular, to
be disclosed of each director is any family relationship with any director and/or major shareholder.
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managers, as agents for owners, may take actions which are not in the best interest of the
owners. The dysfunctional “managerial opportunism” includes management's incentive to
adopt investment and financing decisions that are disproportionately more beneficial to
them, management's shirking, perquisite consumption, and management's atrophy,
whereby they do not watch over the affairs of the firm as diligently as owner–managers.
In order to align the interests of managers and owners, owners have to incur monitoring
costs, such as appointing independent directors and auditors, and managers have to bear
bonding costs, such as the imposition of a performance-based remuneration structure. Thus,
Type I agency costs for firms managed by nonowners are higher than owner-managed
firms. Ang, Cole and Lin (1999), Singh and Davidson (2003), and Fleming, Heaney and
McCosker (2005) provide direct evidence that agency costs, measured in terms of asset
utilization and operating expenses, are higher for outsider managed firms than firms that are
managed by owners (insiders) themselves.
However, owner–managers, as exemplified by the family firm, can create Type II agency
costs, whereby owner–managers become so dominant and entrenched that they become
predators to the minority owners (Morck & Yeung, 2003; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This concentrated ownership creates “owner opportunism,” when
owner–managers engage in self-dealing transactions that benefit themselves at the expense of
minority owners, or practice nepotism by installing family members who suffer from honest
incompetence and deficits of expertise (Hendry, 2002; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dina, &Buchholtz,
2001). Wang (2006) and Ali et al. (2007) argue and provide empirical evidence that the
difference in agency costs across family and nonfamily firms due to Type I agency problems
(managerial opportunism or that misalignment effect) overwhelms the difference in agency
costs across family and nonfamily firms due to Type II agency problems (owner opportunism
or the entrenchment effect). Specifically,Wang (2006) observes that family firms report better
quality earnings in terms of lower absolute abnormal accruals, larger earnings response
coefficient and less persistence of transitory loss components in earnings. In the same vein, Ali
et al. (2007) document that family firms have larger earnings response coefficient, exhibit less
positive discretionary accruals, have greater predictability of cash flows, and aremore likely to
provide voluntary disclosure of bad news through earnings warnings.
Based on theoretical arguments and empirical evidence from Wang (2006) and Ali et al.
(2007), it is hypothesized that family firms in Malaysia provide better financial disclosures
through early adoption of FRS 114. Accordingly,
H1. Ceteris paribus, family firms aremore likely to adopt FRS 114 prior to its mandatory date.
Independent directors are perceived as a potential solution to many of the corporate
governance problems. The presence of independent directors on the board serves as a check
on management on behalf of shareholders. Theoretically, they can monitor management
effectively as they have no need or inclination to stay in the good graces of management,
and can speak out, inside and outside the boardroom, in the face of management misdeeds,
in order to protect the interests of shareholders (Clarke, 2006). Section 301 of the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002 requires that all members of a listed company's audit committee be
independent directors. The NYSE Rules stipulate that independent directors must constitute
a majority of the board except when the company is a controlled company. The Combined
Code in the United Kingdom specifies that nonexecutive directors should constitute not less
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than one third of the board and the majority of nonexecutive directors should be
independent of management and free from any business or other relationship which could
materially interfere with the exercise of their independent judgment.
In Malaysia, the role of independent directors in improving corporate governance has also
been recognized. One recommendation of the voluntary Malaysian Code on Corporate
Governance released in March 2000 is that at least one third of corporate board members be
independent directors. This requirement is now embodied in paragraph 3.14 of the Bursa
Malaysia Listing Requirements. In addition, the Listing Requirements also stipulate that the
audit committee must comprise a majority of independent directors and the chairman of the
audit committee must be an independent director (paragraphs 15.10 and 15.11). In the 2008
Budget Speech delivered by the Malaysian Prime Minister in September 2007, he announced
various measures to further strengthen corporate governance which are now incorporated in
the revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2007). The key amendments include
establishing an Auditing Oversight Board under the auspices of the Securities Commission,
prohibiting executive directors from becoming members of the audit committee, and
mandating an internal audit function for all publicly listed companies.
Using the principal–agent setting, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) argue for the coexistence of
two control mechanisms to reduce agency costs, namely independent directors and voluntary
disclosure. A higher level of disclosure imposes costs on the agents, limiting their
opportunistic behavior and the personal benefits of control. With higher disclosure, principals
are more likely to discover and sanction agents' self-dealing activities, which deter the agents
from pursuing dysfunctional behavior. In the presence of independent directors who limit the
agent's opportunistic behavior, ex-ante, the release of voluntary information is less costly to
the agents because they have less to gain from retaining such information.
Despite the appealing explanation on the usefulness of independent directors, the empirical
evidence on the contribution independent directors make to corporate transparency is
generally mixed. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) show that firms with higher a proportion of
independent directors, or with a majority of independent directors on the board, have higher
levels of voluntary disclosure in Singapore. Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian (2008) reveal that
independent directors effectively restrain earnings management among Standard and Poor's
100 firms in the United States. Patelli and Prencipe (2007), using both the legal and stricter
definition of independent directors, show that independent directors promote voluntary
disclosure among Italian companies with dominant shareholders. On the other hand, Ho and
Wong (2001) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) do not find any significant relationship between
independent directors and the extent of voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and Malaysia,
respectively.
Based on the above-mentioned explanation, the following hypothesis is posited:
H2a. Ceteris paribus, firmswith a greater percentage of independent directors on their boards
are more likely to adopt FRS 114 prior to its mandatory date.
Although securities regulators emphasize the importance of independent directors, other
studies by Dalton et al. (1998), Bhagat and Black (1999), Hermalin and Weisbech (2003),
Carter and Lorsch (2004), Anderson and Reeb (2004) and Fogel and Geier (2007) do not
find that independent directors add value. Fogel and Geier (2007) provide one possible
explanation as to why the presence of independent directors does not have the intended
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effect of promoting good corporate governance or generating better financial returns for
shareholders. They assert that under the Sarbanes–Oxley regime, which gives short shrift to
the role and efficacy of independent directors by focusing on the independence of auditors
and internal controls, company managers are accountable to independent directors who
have vastly less information about what is occurring inside the company than the
company's managers. As a result, company managers, who have the information advantage
over the directors are notionally accountable to a board of strangers and they have no real
accountability to the owners.
Carter and Lorsch (2004) concur with the idea that independence has its downside; in
fact, sometimes independence can make directors even more captive to management's view
of the business. To overcome this inconvenient truth, they suggest that it might be better if a
board has a few nonexecutive directors who have deeper knowledge of the company and its
industry because of prior association even though this knowledge prevents them from being
classified as truly independent (page 46).
Dalton et al. (1998) contend that nonmanagement directors whose affiliation is derived
from a professional or business relationship (i.e. supplier, customer, legal counsel, and
management consultant) may be highly effective at the resource dependence and counseling/
expertise board roles due to their industry contacts, business acumen, specialized knowledge,
and skills. They are appointed as board members so that the firm can tap into the resources that
they bring. Similarly, Anderson and Reeb (2004) posit that directors classified as affiliates
often have skills in knowledge-based fields such as law, finance, accounting, and consulting,
and they are sought after for their value-adding advice and counsel.
Given the potential contribution from nonexecutive affiliated directors who possess
better firm-specific knowledge than independent directors, it is rather disappointing to note
that several studies that document a link between financial disclosure quality and
nonexecutive directors (see, for example, Beekes et al., 2004; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005
and Ajinkya et al., 2005) do not make a distinction between independent and affiliated
directors. Accepting that independent and affiliated directors are two different breeds of
nonexecutives who are conceptually not identical, the following hypothesis is proposed in
order to test for their differential contributions, if any, in promoting corporate transparency:
H2b. Ceteris paribus, firms with a greater percentage of affiliated directors on their boards
are more likely to adopt FRS 114 prior to its mandatory date.
3. Methodology
3.1. Identifying early adopters and matching procedures
Early adopters were identified from online searches using the Bursa Malaysia database
(http://announcements.bursamalaysia.com). The 2001 and 2002 annual reports and annual
audited accounts (excluding financial statements ending 31 December 2002) were text-
searched for specific phrases unique to MASB 22 such as “primary reporting,” “segment
liabilities,” “MASB 22,” “Standard 22” and “Standard No 22.” The searches were
conducted in November 2002 and April 2003. Upon detailed inspection of the relevant
annual reports or annual audited accounts of the “hit” companies, it was found that some of
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these documents, although having the above phrases, are not related to MASB 22 adoption.
For example, Fututech Berhad (formerly Ulbon), in its annual report 2001, disclosed in
Note 2 (a): Significant Accounting Policies:
The promulgated standardsMASB19: EventsAfter the Balance Sheet Date,MASB20:
Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, MASB 21: Business
Combinations, MASB 22: Segment Reporting, MASB 23: Impairment of Assets and
MASB 24: Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation have been adopted prior
to their effective dates.
However, under Note 31: Segmental Information, the annual report states:
No segmental reporting is prepared as the Group's activities are carried out primarily in
Malaysia and the Group's operations are substantially in the manufacturing sector only.
Eliminating the inappropriate “hits,” 32 different companies that adopted MASB 22
prior to its effective date were identified.3
The early adopters were matched on a paired basis with nonearly adopters based on a
similar board of exchange (main or second board), sectoral classification, financial year-
end, and number of business segments (plus or minus one is acceptable if exact matching is
not possible). The number of business and geographical segments were obtained from the
segment disclosures in the notes to the financial statements. Thus, a total of 64 companies
comprising 32 early adopters of FRS 114 and a control group of 32 nonearly adopters were
examined in this study (see Appendix A).
The early adopters' segment disclosures were scrutinized, and the accounting treatments
for the ten mandatory items in the primary segment reporting format were coded as follows
(see Appendix B): (A) allocated to segments, (U) disclosed in aggregate in the segment report
without allocating to segments, i.e., unallocated, (NA) not applicable (since the items are also
not disclosed elsewhere in the consolidated financial statements, and (ND) not disclosed in the
segment report although they are disclosed elsewhere in the consolidated financial statements.
Early adopters with at least one item designated “ND” were judged not fully compliant with
FRS 114 disclosures and categorized as partial early adopters, and the remaining as full early
adopters. These procedures yielded 15 full and 17 partial early adopters.
3.2. Early adoption model
Two logistic regression models, binary and multinomial, were tested. In the binary
model, the dependent variable is dichotomous and takes the value of either one (early
adopters) or zero (nonearly adopters) and in the multinomial model, the dependent variable
is trichotomous and takes the value of zero (full early adopters), one (partial early adopters)
and two (non early adopters). As explained in Ireland (2003), in a multinomial model, these
3 One company, Amtel, was excluded as its financial year-end 30 November 2002, is very near the effective
date of MASB 22, financial year-end 31 December 2002. Subsequently, the search for early adopters was also
widened to include financial statements for 2000, but this procedure yielded only one company, i.e., Khind. In
2000, Khind operated in a single business segment and adopted the geographical segment as the primary reporting
format. Khind disaggregated its total liabilities into Malaysia and rest of the world segments.
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codings serve merely to identify the different outcomes. They are meaningless in
themselves and do not imply any rankings or ordering in the multinomial model (p. 981).
The motivation to run both binary and multinomial models comes from Powell (1997). He
shows that in modeling the relationship between a firm's characteristics and its takeover
likelihood, more insight can be gained from segregating takeover targets into hostile or
friendly targets than treating them as homogenous. He cautions that “the use of a binomial
specification to model takeover likelihood is likely to be incorrect and conclusions based on
such a model are likely to be misleading and result in incorrect inferences regarding the
characteristics of firms subject to takeover” (p. 1026).
Following prior studies such as Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Prencipe (2004) and Wan-
Hussin, Che-Adam, Lode andKamardin (2005), in addition to the variables of interest, namely
representation by family members on a board as a proxy for family firms and other board
characteristics, we also included six control variables to explain early adoption of FRS 114.
These are firm sizewhich is proxied by natural log of total assets (LNASSET), DEBTwhich is
measured as total loans divided by shareholders equity, INST which is the cumulative
ownership by the four largest institutional investors, return on assets (ROA), board size
(BSIZE), and a dummy variable CEOMALAY which indicates whether the Chief Executive
Officer is ethnic Malay or Chinese.4
Barry and Brown (1986) and Lang and Lundholm (1996) posit that larger firms have an
incentive to disclose more than smaller firms because the annual reports of the larger firms are
more likely to be scrutinized by financial analysts. Chow and Susela Devi (2001) and Wan-
Hussin et al. (2005) show that segment disclosure inMalaysia is related to firm size. Smith and
Warner (1979) suggest that by supplying more information to debt suppliers, voluntary
disclosure can reduce the agency costs for highly leveraged firms. This argument is reinforced
byMcKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) who argue that by providing segment information, debt
suppliers can make better predictions about the growth, risks, and return prospects of
diversified companies, or group of companies. Bradbury (1992), Mitchell, Chia and Loh
(1995) and Chow and Susela Devi (2001) show that there is a positive relationship between
financial leverage and the level of segment disclosure.
Institutional investors have the incentives to collect information and monitor management,
thus they are able to demand greater corporate transparency and promote accounting-report
integrity. Yeo, Tan, Ho and Chen (2002), Chung, Firth and Kim (2002), Jung and Kwon
(2002), Koh (2003) and Cornett et al. (2008) provide evidence that institutional investors
monitor and constrain the self-serving behavior of managers in the United States, Australia,
Korea and Singapore.
Segment information may also reveal the existence of business opportunities to
competitors and harm the disclosing firm's competitive position (Nichols and Street, 2007).
Thus, the proprietary costs arising fromdisclosing segment information, tend to be particularly
high for growing companies. Return on assets is included as a control variable as proxy for
proprietary costs.
Board size is included as a control variable, given its growing importance in
contemporary financial studies, such as by Byard, Li and Weintrop (2006), Boone, Field,
4 Although Malaysia is a multicultural society with three main ethnic groups, the indigenous Malays (the
majority), the Chinese, and the Indians, in the sample companies, the CEO is either Malay or Chinese.
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Karpoff and Raheja (2007), Cheng (2008) and Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008).
Furthermore, board size is shown to be positively related to earnings management in
Malaysia (Abdul-Rahman and Mohamed-Ali, 2006). Finally, Haniffa and Cooke (2002)
show that the proportion of Malay directors on a board positively influences the level of
voluntary disclosure in Malaysia, which is consistent with the notion that Malay-cum-
Muslim CEOs adhere to Islamic business ethics which encourage transparency in business
as espoused by Gambling and Abdel-Karim (1991).
3.3. Data collection and sample description
For all the sample companies, information from the annual reports relating to the board
composition including proportion of family members on the board (FAMILY), proportion
of nonexecutives (NONEXEC) comprising independent directors (IND), and nonindepen-
dent nonexecutive directors (AFFILIATE), size of board (BSIZE), largest four institutional
investors (INST), and CEO ethnicity (whether Malay or Chinese) (CEOMALAY) were
hand collected. Financial data such as total assets, short- and long-term loans, shareholders'
equity, and profit before tax were also collected. Given that studies have shown that the
governance mechanisms in family firms are different from nonfamily firms in terms of
board leadership and CEO duality (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) data on board leadership were
also collected to provide additional insight into the situation in Malaysia.
A summary of the characteristics of sample companies is reported in Table 1, partitioned by
full, partial, and nonearly adopters. PanelA shows the characteristics of the sample by board of
exchange. About two-thirds of the sample companies are from theMainBoard. Panel B shows
that the majority of early adopters had adopted FRS 114 for their financial years-end on or
before 31December 2001.With respect to sector, panel C indicates that more than 80% of our
sample companies come from five sectors: construction, consumer products, industrial
products, plantation, and property.
Panels D and E display information on the number of business segments and
geographical segments. On average, the full early adopters have more business and
geographical segments than the other two subgroups. Full early adopters are most likely to
have a dual board leadership structure where the same person or different persons from the
same family hold(s) both the CEO and Chairman roles, as shown in panel F. Likewise,
panel G indicates that full early adopters are most likely to have an executive chairman. On
the other hand, partial early adopters are least likely to have a dual board leadership
structure. Finally, Panel H shows that full early adopters are more likely to have Malay
CEOs than partial and nonearly adopters.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Univariate analysis
Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics of independent variables included in the study,
partitioned by full early adopters, partial early adopters, and nonearly adopters. A comparison
between full early adopters and nonearly adopters shows that full early adopters have a
significantly higher proportion of affiliated directors, and are significantly larger and more
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profitable than nonearly adopters. Full early adopters are also significantly larger than partial
early adopters. All the subgroups (full early adopters, partial early adopters and nonearly
adopters) are significantly different in terms of proportions of affiliated directors and their total
assets, as indicated by the F statistics.
4.2. Multivariate analysis
The Pearson pairwise correlations between the continuous independent variables are
shown in Table 3. The proportion of family members on the board negatively correlates
Table 1
Sample characteristics.
Full early adopter Partial early adopter Nonearly adopter Total
Panel A: by board of exchange
Main board 10 (67%) 12 (71%) 22 (69%) 44 (69%)
Second board 5 (33%) 5 (29%) 10 (31%) 20 (31%)
Panel B: by year
2001 10 (67%) 10 (59%) 20 (62%) 40 (63%)
2002 5 (33%) 7 (41%) 12 (38%) 24 (37%)
Panel C: by sector
Construction 2 (13%) 4 (23%) 6 (19%) 12 (19%)
Consumer products 3 (20%) 4 (23%) 7 (22%) 14 (22%)
Finance 1 (7%) 1 (6%) 2 (6%) 4 (6%)
Industrial products 3 (20%) 3 (18%) 6 (19%) 12 (19%)
Plantation 5 (33%) 0 5 (16%) 10 (16%)
Properties 0 3 (18%) 3 (9%) 6 (9%)
Technology 0 1 (6%) 1 (3%) 2 (3%)
Trading/services 1 (7%) 1 (6%) 2 (6%) 4 (6%)
Panel D: by no. of business segments
1 0 1 (6%) 1 (3%) 2 (3%)
2 2 (13%) 2 (12%) 4 (12%) 8 (13%)
3 5 (33%) 6 (35%) 11 (34%) 22 (34%)
4 1 (7%) 3 (18%) 7 (22%) 11 (17%)
At least 5 7 (47%) 5 (29%) 9 (28%) 21 (33%)
Panel E: by no. of geographical segments
1 4 (27%) 8 (47%) 17 (53%) 29 (45%)
2 4 (27%) 6 (35%) 7 (22%) 17 (27%)
3 1 (7%) 2 (12%) 5 (16%) 8 (13%)
4 1 (7%) 0 2 (6%) 3 (5%)
At least 5 5 (33%) 1 (6%) 1 (3%) 7 (11%)
Panel F: by CEO duality
CEO=Chairman 8 (53%) 4 (23%) 10 (31%) 22 (34%)
CEO ≠ Chairman 7 (47%) 13 (77%) 22 (69%) 42 (66%)
Panel G: by board leadership
Chairman is executive 8 (53%) 4 (23%) 14 (44%) 26 (41%)
Chairman is nonexecutive 7 (47%) 13 (77%) 18 (56%) 38 (59%)
Panel H: by race of CEO
CEO is Malay 6 (40%) 3 (18%) 6 (19%) 15 (23%)
CEO is Chinese 9 (60%) 14 (82%) 26 (81%) 49 (77%)
The figures in bracket may not add to 100% due to rounding.
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with the proportion of nonexecutive directors, affiliated directors, independent directors
and, with institutional ownership, total assets, and Malay CEOs. Firms with high
institutional ownership appear to have a larger proportion of nonexecutive directors, a
larger board size, and more total assets. Firms with a higher proportion of affiliated
directors tend to have larger board size, more total assets and institutional investors, and
perform better. Ignoring the fourth column, NONEXEC, none of the correlation
coefficients among the independent variables is greater than 0.5. This suggests that
multicollinearity is not a cause for concern. When the models are run using ordinary least
squares regression, none of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) exceeds 2, which reinforces
that the independent variables do not suffer from multicollinearity problems.
Tables 4 and 5 present parameter estimates of binomial and multinomial models with
corresponding coefficient values and standard errors. For the binomial regression (Models 1
and 3), a positive sign on a parameter indicates that an increase in the corresponding
variable increases the likelihood of early adoption and a negative sign indicates otherwise.
For the multinomial regression (Models 2 and 4), the parameters are interpreted as an
Table 2











% Family members on
board (FAMILY):
0.35 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.66 0.71 −0.09 0.34
% Independent directors
on board (IND):




0.35 0.28 0.20 0.26 2.75 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.96 1.41 3.57 ⁎⁎
% Nonexecutive directors on
board (NONEXEC):
0.71 0.65 0.59 0.63 1.74 ⁎ 0.67 1.15 1.88
Asset (RM billion): 2.49 0.46 0.64 1.03 2.10 ⁎⁎ 2.29 ⁎⁎ −0.89 7.08 ⁎⁎⁎
Natural log Asset
(LNASSET):




1.06 0.22 1.02 0.54 0.06 1.25 −1.62 0.78
% Institutional ownership
(INST):
0.22 0.10 0.13 0.14 1.28 1.51 −0.59 2.20
Return on assets (ROA): 0.04 0.03 −0.03 0.00 2.28 ⁎⁎ 0.16 1.23 1.68




0.40 0.18 0.19 0.23 1.43 1.38 −0.09 1.50
Full (n=15) and partial adopters (n=17) are subsets of early adopters (n=32). There are 32 nonearly adopters.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1% level or better (for t-test, two-tailed and assuming unequal variances).
⁎⁎ Significant at 5% level or better (for t-test, two-tailed and assuming unequal variances).
⁎ Significant at 10% level or better (for t-test, two-tailed and assuming unequal variances).
324 W.N. Wan-Hussin / The International Journal of Accounting 44 (2009) 313–333
indication of the probability of an event either being a full adopter or partial adopter,
relative to the probability of being a nonearly adopter. In all specifications, the reference
outcome is the probability companies whose financial statements ended before 31
December 2002, have not yet adopted FRS 114.
For Model 1, the Nagelkerke R2 of 0.205 indicates a mild relationship between dependent
and independent variables. In addition, the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit gives a chi-
square of 3.37 (level of significance is 0.877), which indicates a good model fit between the
actual and predicted value of the dependent variable. The percentage of correct classification
for Model 1 is 67.2%. The results reveal FAMILY and NONEXEC are significant at the 10%
level with positive direction. This suggests that the higher the proportion of family members
on the board, which is a proxy for the family firm and the proportion of nonexecutive directors
on board, the higher the likelihood that the company will adopt FRS 114 early.
ForModel 2, the likelihood ratio is 95.90 and is highly significant.When early adopters are
partitioned into full adopters and partial adopters, the strength of the relationship as indicated
by the NagelkerkeR2 is considerably higher thanModel 1. Thus, the multinomial model has a
better explanatory power than the binary model that treats full and partial early adopters as a
homogenous group. For full early adopters, FAMILY is found to be significant at the 1% level
with a positive coefficient, which suggests that a family firm is more likely to early adopt FRS
114 (with full disclosure). This result is consistent with H1 and previous studies that associate
the family firm with greater disclosures (Ali et al., 2007; Wang, 2006). However, it is at odds
with aMalaysian study byHaniffa and Cooke (2002) that shows that family firms tend to have
lower voluntary disclosure. The reason could be due to the difference in the dependent variable
of interest. Haniffa andCooke (2002) examine an array of voluntary disclosures which include
corporate social responsibility, prospective financial information, and other narrative
disclosures, and not just segmental disclosure. Firmswith a higher proportion of nonexecutive
directors, Malay CEOs, and a larger asset size are also more likely to be full early adopters
rather than nonearly adopters.
When NONEXEC is replaced with AFFILIATE and IND as indicated in Models 3 and 4
of Table 5, the overall results are qualitatively similar. However, IND is found to be
Table 3
Pearson correlation matrix.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. FAMILY −0.36 ⁎⁎ −0.43 ⁎⁎ −0.56 ⁎⁎ −0.38 ⁎⁎ 0.04 −0.10 −0.21 −0.47 ⁎⁎ −0.26
2. AFFILIATE −0.16 0.85 ⁎⁎ 0.31 ⁎ −0.09 0.33 ⁎⁎ 0.30 ⁎ 0.27 ⁎ 0.14
3. IND 0.38 ⁎⁎ 0.10 −0.04 0.02 −0.14 0.24 0.10
4. NONEXEC 0.35 ⁎⁎ −0.10 0.32 ⁎ 0.21 0.38 ⁎⁎ 0.18
5. LNASSET 0.16 0.19 0.27 ⁎ 0.40 ⁎⁎ 0.19
6. DEBT −0.09 −0.19 −0.16 −0.14
7. ROA 0.29 ⁎ 0.05 −0.23
8. BSIZE 0.29 ⁎ −0. 01
9. INST 0.45 ⁎⁎
10. CEOMALAY
The dependent variables are described in Table 2.
⁎⁎ Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2−tailed).
⁎ Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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insignificant, while AFFILIATE is significant with a positive direction in both models. This
indicates that affiliated directors, rather than independent directors, may play an important
role in influencing early adoption. Thus, H2b is accepted while H2a is rejected. The results
replicate the univariate analysis that shows early adopters have a significantly higher
affiliated director proportion than nonearly adopters, while the independent director
proportions are almost identical for early and nonearly adopters.
The insignificant result for independent directors is consistent with prior Malaysian studies
which document that independent directors do not constrain earningsmanagement. (Abdullah
and Mohd-Nasir, 2004; Mohd-Salleh, Iskandar, & Rahmat, 2005; Abdul-Rahman and
Mohamed-Ali, 2006).A plausible explanation for the lack of association between independent
directors and corporate transparency stems from the tendency of CEOs or controlling
shareholders to nominate “independent” directors who are beholden to them. However, if they
are not subservient to the CEOs/controlling shareholders, their lack of knowledge in the
company's affairs hinders them fromdischarging their board duties effectively. Another likely
reason for their apparent ineffectiveness is the propensity to select them for political reasons, to
legitimize business activities, and for contacts and contracts, rather than for their expertise and
experience (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006).
Table 4
Parameter estimates of the binomial and multinomial models (independent and affiliated directors are combined as
nonexecutive directors — NONEXEC).
Variables Binomial— Model 1 Multinomial— Model 2







Constant −4.586 4.949 −30.371 ⁎⁎⁎ 10.523 5.347 6.745
FAMILY 2.730 ⁎ 1.517 10.129 ⁎⁎⁎ 3.262 −0.041 1.838
INST 0.011 2.035 2.113 2.824 −3.313 3.099
NONEXEC 3.089 ⁎ 1.805 6.480 ⁎⁎ 2.842 2.427 2.164
CEOMALAY 0.949 0.780 2.626 ⁎⁎ 1.279 0.411 0.933
BSIZE 0.130 0.159 0.318 0.251 0.172 0.197
LNASSET 0.030 0.245 0.899 ⁎⁎ 0.423 −0.431 0.355
DEBT −0.015 0.131 0.238 0.162 −0.225 0.326
ROA 2.752 2.317 2.698 3.373 3.213 3.049
Model 2 Model 1
Likelihood ratio 78.03 (df=8) 95.90 (df=16)***
Nagelkerke R2 0.205 0.503
McFadden R2 – 0.279
Hosmer and Lemeshow 3.37 (df=8) –
Percentage correct 67.2% 67.2%
In Model 1, the dependent variable is dichotomous and takes the value of either one (early adopters) or zero
(nonearly adopters). In Model 2, the dependent variable is trichotomous and takes the value of zero (full early
adopters), one (partial early adopters) and two (nonearly adopters). See Table 2 for variables description.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significant at 1% level or better.
⁎⁎ Indicates significant at 5% level or better.
⁎ Indicates significant at 10% level or better.
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It is also worth noting that institutional shareholding is not significant in all the models,
consistent with Haniffa and Cooke (2002). Perhaps this observation that institutional
ownership does not positively influence corporate transparency is unique for Malaysia. In
Malaysia, the major institutional shareholders are government-linked investors such as the
Ministry of Finance Incorporated (now known as Khazanah Holdings), Employees Provident
Fund (EPF), which is a pension fund for private sector employees, Lembaga Tabung Haji
(LTH) or the Pilgrim Fund, various Amanah Saham unit trusts that cater mostly for the
indigenous Malay investors managed by Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), a
superannuation fund related to government employees serving in the Armed Forces, such
as Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), and various State Investment Foundations.
These government-linked investors are not known to be active monitors, at least during the
period of study.
The finding that a Malay CEO is associated with greater segmental disclosure is consistent
with Haniffa and Cooke (2002). As argued earlier from the Islamic business ethics
perspective, the propensity of Muslim-cum-Malay CEOs to adopt the segment reporting
standard prior to its effective date seems compatible with Islamic social philosophy and
principles of full disclosure (Baydoun & Willet, 2000).
Table 5
Parameter estimates of the binomial and multinomial models (independent and affiliated directors are distinct,
indicated by variable IND and AFFILIATE, respectively).
Variables Binomial — Model 3 Multinomial — Model 4







Constant −2.977 5.162 −28.727 ⁎⁎⁎ 10.574 7.347 7.229
FAMILY 2.380 1.567 9.448 ⁎⁎⁎ 3.305 −0.293 1.874
INST 0.270 2.072 2.325 2.929 −2.954 3.133
AFFILIATE 3.445 ⁎ 1.867 6.954 ⁎⁎ 2.904 2.900 2.241
IND 0.688 3.152 2.661 5.197 0.063 3.712
CEOMALAY 0.888 0.783 2.604 ⁎⁎ 1.289 0.353 0.937
BSIZE 0.083 0.168 0.263 0.258 0.113 0.212
LNASSET 0.012 0.246 0.911 ⁎⁎ 0.430 −0.469 0.358
DEBT −0.022 0.135 0.231 0.167 −0.232 0.332
ROA 2.742 2.324 2.739 3.430 3.075 3.001
Model 3 Model 4
Likelihood ratio 77.16 (df =9) 94.71 (df=18)***
Nagelkerke R2 0.220 0.514
McFadden R2 – 0.288
Hosmer and Lemeshow 7.593 (df=8) –
Percentage correct 68.8% 67.2%
In Model 3, the dependent variable is dichotomous and takes the value of either one (early adopters) or zero
(nonearly adopters). In Model 4, the dependent variable is trichotomous and takes the value of zero (full early
adopters), one (partial early adopters) and two (non early adopters). See Table 2 for variables description.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significant at 1% level or better.
⁎⁎ Indicates significant at 5% level or better.
⁎ Indicates significant at 10% level or better.
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When Models 3 and 4 were re-run by excluding four of the inconsequential control
variables namely INST, BSIZE, DEBT and ROA, the results were quantitatively similar. In
the multinomial model, the likelihood of adopting the full primary-segment disclosures is
positively associated with family firm, affiliated directors, Malay CEO, and firm size. In the
binomial model, the only variable that is significant is affiliated directors. However, with
lesser independent variables, the R2 is reduced, with moderate model fit.
5. Conclusions
This study documents that companies with a higher proportion of family members on the
board and affiliated directors are more inclined to provide greater disclosure of the primary
segment items. My finding that the family firm is associated with a higher likelihood of
increased segment disclosure is consistent with extant literature (Wang, 2006; Ali et al., 2007).
The proportion of independent directors and the level of institutional shareholding are of no
consequence in determining the likelihood that a company provides greater financial disclosure
through early adoption of FRS 114. This finding, that independent directors do not add to
quality financial disclosure, is consistent with previous Malaysian studies such as Abdullah
and Mohd-Nasir (2004), Mohd-Salleh et al. (2005) and Abdul-Rahman and Mohamed-Ali
(2006), but is at odds with the international evidence in the United States, United Kingdom,
Italy and Singapore.WhenMalaysian data are used, as in this study, the results suggest that that
the presence of independent directors is unlikely to enhance corporate transparency and there is
even possibility that independent directors collude with CEOs to exacerbate the agency
problem. My results agree with the position taken by the Asian Shadow Financial Regulatory
Committee, that the value of amateur, part-time independent directors is doubtful and also
suggest that controlling shareholders should be excluded from voting for independent directors
to protect the rights of minority shareholders.5
While corporate governance guidelines all over theworld specify that independent directors
providemuch in theway of benefits to shareholders, investors and regulators should bewary of
situations where the CEOs select seemingly independent directors to give an illusion of active
monitoring (Byrd & Hickman, 1992), when in fact these appointees are mere shills for
management. Our study suggests that an affiliated director, the other type of nonexecutive
director, who is often overlooked in prior research, could enhance corporate transparency, and
therefore, more attention should be given to this category of nonexecutive director.
Future studies should examine carefully the profiles and attributes of affiliated and
independent directors such as tenure (relative to the current CEO), multiple directorships
(CEO or nonCEO, and if nonCEO, executive or nonexecutive) in other companies (related
or unrelated), nature of affiliation (personal or professional), financial literacy, and political
connection, to shed further light on which of these characteristics facilitate corporate
transparency. Another subject for future studies is alternative measurements of the family
firm such as the cumulative share ownership by all family members, subject to data
availability. Based on insight from Effiezal, How and Verhoven (2007), future studies
should also consider the heterogeneity of institutional investors in Malaysia. Their study
5 Statement No. 3 (July 11, 2005) issued during the Asian Finance Association Conference held in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.
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indicates that only the Employees Provident Fund plays an effective role in strengthening
corporate governance in Malaysia.
Although the current study only considers the disclosure of primary-segment items, I do
not anticipate that the results would be materially different if the disclosure of secondary-
segment items were also considered. The results of this study should be treated with
caution, however because the sample of early adopters is unavoidably small.
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Appendix A. Sample firms
(continued on next page)
Full early adopters Nonearly adopters
Audrey International (M) Abric
Batu Kawan Brem Holding
Guthrie Ropel CCM
Highlands and lowlands Cosway
Hing Yap Knitting Ind Daiman Development
IJM Eurospan Holdings
Kossan Rubber Ind Federal Furniture
Kuala Lumpur Kepong Fourseason (M)
Kumpulan Belton Globetronics Tech
Kumpulan Guthrie HLG Capital
MTD Capital Ho Hup Construction Co
Perak Corp Intan Utilities




Partial early adopters Malaysian General Insurance
CCK Nam Fatt Corp
DKLS Ind Pie
Europlus Plantation and Development (M)
F & N QL Resources
Fiamma Rex
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Appendix B. Mandatory disclosures for primary segment reporting
Source: Malaysian Accounting Standard Board 22— Segment Reporting (1 January 2002).
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